Chapter in Imaging
China: Regional Division and National Unity
Ed. by Shu-min Huang & Cheng-kuang Hsu.
Taipei: Institute of Ethnology. P. 43-80.
From the Qiang Barbarians to the Qiang
Nationality:
The Making of a New Chinese Boundary
Wang Ming-ke
This chapter has two purposes.
First, we study how the mountain people living along the upper Min River Valley
in northwestern Sichuan have gradually gained their Qiang ªÊ ethnic identity in the last
half century as the result of selecting and remodeling their own history,
folklore, legends, and historical as well as ethnographical information
provided by the Han Chinese and foreign missionaries. Second, we examine how
the geographical and ethnic concepts of the Qiang have been re-delineated and
the pertinent histories have been rewritten by the Han Chinese to define and
redefine their ethnic boundaries for more than 3,000 years, especially in the
recent 100 years in which traditional China came to be a nation-state and the
Han Chinese the majority population in a nation ¾ Zhonghua minzu ¤¤µØ¥Á±Ú ¾
in a modern sense.
In the 1930s,
Maurice Halbwachs suggested that memory is a collective social activity, and
that all social groups and institutions have corresponding social memories.
Social organization provides a persistent structure to which our memory must
conform. To reinforce the sense of oneness, members of a social group preserve
their collective memories in, or renew their collective memories through,
mnemonic media such as artifacts, rituals and writings (Halbwachs 1992: 38,
119; Coser 1992: 22). Since the 1980s, questions such as how societies
constantly imagine or invent their own pasts to enhance group feeling among
their members (Hobsbawm 1983; Anderson 1991), and how societies have
reconstructed or reinvented their pasts to meet social changes (Schwartz 1990;
Fentress and Wickham 1992) have become major concerns among scholars of various
backgrounds.
The narrative
aspect of the past is also noted by students of ethnicity and nationalism. One
of the conclusions that primordialists and instrumentalists in the
anthropological studies of ethnicity of the 1970s reached was that common
origins are important in solidifying ethnic bonds. Furthermore, these so-called
common origins need not be rooted in a factual past but can be a subjectively
reconstructed past, corresponding to what Clifford Geertz termed ¡§assumed blood ties¡¨ (1973: 261-62) and to Charles
Keyes¡¦s notion of ¡§cultural interpretation of
descent¡¨ (1981: 5).
Over the years, more scholars have turned their attention to the study of how ¡§history¡¨ is imagined and selected by
various ethnic/social groups to solidify group attachments (Tonkin, McDonald
and Chapman 1989; Smith 1987: 191; Roosens 1989; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983;
Anderson 1981). There is also a similar tendency among many anthropologists ¡§to do ethnography of the
historical imagination¡¨
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). In this respect, the case of the Qiang with its
history of historical imagination through 3,000 years in Chinese documents
provides an excellent opportunity for examining how 'history' has been
rewritten and reinterpreted by the Han to redefine their ethnic boundaries, and
how events and legends of the past have been selectively learned and reinterpreted
by the natives to create their Qiang identity.
Today the Qiang is one of the
55 officially recognized ethnic minorities in China, with a population of
approximately 200,000 living mainly in Wenchuan ¨Z¤t, Lixian ²z¿¤, Maoxian Z¿¤, Songpan ªQ¼ï in Aba Zangzu Qiangzu
Autonomous Prefecture ªüÅòÂñڪʱڦ۪v¦{, and Beichuan ¥_¤t in the Mianyang ºø¶§ region, all in northwestern Sichuan province. Although now
a minor segment of the population, the Qiang is commonly believed to be a very
old people whose history can be traced to the Shang dynasty (Gu 1980; Ren, Li,
& Zhou 1984). It is also believed to be a once strong and populous group
whose offspring can now be found among, besides the Qiang in northwestern
Sichuan, the Han, the Tibetans, and many minorities in southwestern China (Ran,
Li, and Zhou 1984).
From another angle, however, the Qiang nationality is a new
ethnicity. Many scholars argue that ethnic self-identification and memory of
common origin among natives, and ethnic self-awareness, are the necessary hallmarks
of the making of an ethnic group. In this case, the people we call Qiang
acquired and accepted the ethnic label Qiang
zu ªÊ±Ú (Qiang
nationality) only in the last half-century. Further, the memories of their past
¾ the history of the Qiang ¾ have been learned, selected,
interpreted, and distributed by Qiang literati who became a core group in
native society no earlier than the 1960s. Nevertheless, the Qiang today are
definitely an ethnic group with a common self-appellation (Qiang zu or erma º¸º¿ [1]), historical memories (even
some natives are arguing over the details of these memories and still others
are encouraged to learn them) and ethnic self-awareness.
This chapter
examines three historical processes. The first is a long historical process
from the Later Han dynasty (A.D. 25-220) to the Qing dynasty (1644-1910).
Within this period, the concept of the Qiang ¾
meaning ¡¥those people in the west who
are not one of us¡¦ ¾
among ancient Chinese first served as a western ethnic boundary of the Huaxia
(the ancient Han Chinese) referring to a huge range of people living mainly
along the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau. But through interacting with
the ancient Chinese and Tibetans, more and more western ¡§barbarians¡¨ were classified by the
Chinese into new ethnic categories and therefore were pulled out from the
general and blurry category of the Qiang. Finally, during the Ming (1368-1644)
and Qing (1644-1911) periods the term Qiang denoted only the non-Han people
living in the upper Min River Valley and Beichuan area.
The second
process is that, during the late Qing period (approximately 1840-1911), under
the expansion of political and economic imperialism in China and her peripheral
areas, the Han revolutionists and reformists adopted the concepts of nation and
nation-state to build their new country, Zhonghua
minguo ¤¤µØ¥Á°ê
(the Republic of China), and the nation, Zhonghua
minzu ¤¤µØ¥Á±Ú
(the Chinese nation). In this process of nation-building, the traditional
peripheral non-Han aborigines, including the Qiang, and the people of
subordinate polities under the Mandarin regime became ethnic minorities within
the Chinese nation; the nation and nation-state can be seen as a new scheme
within which the old image of central kingdom (Zhongguo ¤¤°ê)
surrounded by subordinate people and states can be maintained.
Third, having
been identified and categorized as the Qiang nationality, natives began to
learn more about themselves. The Qiang literati who have been trained in
Chinese language and culture now functioned as the receivers, interpreters, and
propagandists of native history and cultures; and then finally the Qiang became
an ethnic group in a modern sense.
The Qiang ªÊ
in China¡¦s
Historical Memory
The Chinese have recorded and
preserved memories about the Qiang for thousands of years. At about 1300 B.C.,
people of the ethnic label Qiang , a pictograph composed of sheep and man,
had already been recorded on the oracle-bone inscriptions of the Shang dynasty.
In the eyes of the Shang people, according to these inscriptions, they were a
hostile population living in the west. During the Later Han dynasty (25-220),
people with the ethnic label Qiang were widely distributed along Han China's
western frontiers. Among them, the Qiang living in the upper Yellow River Valley
in eastern Qinghai province are well known for their battles with China at that
time (de Crespigny 1984).
Historians have
pieced together fragments of historical data to reconstruct a whole, continuous
history of the Qiang from the Shang to the Han dynasty, and to the present. The
presumption underlying these studies is clear: both the Qiang of the Shang
dynasty and those of the Han period were the same ¡§people.¡¨ In my doctoral dissertation,
I posed an alternative explanation: Since the word Qiang was an ethnic label by which the Chinese referred to some
non-Chinese in the west, it might be describing a sense of otherness for the
Chinese. As the ethnic entity of the Chinese was forming, Qiang came to denote a shifting ethnic boundary; as western
populations assimilated into the Chinese, this boundary shifted westward.
Finally, during the Later Han period, it reached the eastern edge of the
Tibetan Plateau. This was, and still is in most cases, also an ecological frontier
for the Han Chinese; the Chinese could not manage the lands and peoples beyond
this frontier in the Chinese fashion, nor could the natives of these areas
adopt the Chinese way of food production and social organization. The ethnic
boundary has remained fixed ever since. Thus, during the period from the Shang
to the Han dynasty, the Qiang was not a ¡§people¡¨ that had continuity in time
and space. Instead, it was an ethnic boundary, a concept among the Chinese.
When we trace the history of the Qiang, we are tracing not the native history
of a non-Chinese people but a portion of the history of the Chinese (Wang 1992:
98-140).
During the Later
Han and Wei-Jin periods (25-220, 221-419), Qiang or Qiang ren (the Qiang people) were widely distributed along the mountainous
fringes of the northern and eastern Tibetan Plateau, from the Kunlun Mountains ±X±[¤s in Xinjiang province (East
Turkestan), and eastern Qinghai area, to southern Gansu, western Sichuan, and
northern Yunnan. A geographical or tribal label was added to indicate a
specific Qiang people; thus, in this ¡§Qiang belt,¡¨ there were, from north to
south, Canlang Qiang °Ñ¯TªÊ,
Baima Qiang ¥Õ°¨ªÊ,
Baigou Qiang ¥Õª¯ªÊ,
Bailang Qiang ¥Õ¯TªÊ,
Qingyi Qiang «C¦çªÊ,
Maoniu Qiang ÑѤûªÊ,
among many others (Figure 3.1). In this period, the ancient Chinese tried to
distinguish some ethnic or racial stock from the general concept of the Qiang.
Therefore, there were the Hu J
in the southern end of East Turkestan, the Di ¥Â in southern Gansu and northern Sichuan,
and the Yi ¦i in
southern Sichuan and northern Yunnan. However, the distinction between the
Qiang and the Hu, the Di, and the Yi is not always clear in Chinese documents.
During the period
from the Southern and Northern dynasties (420-589), to the Sui (589-619) and
the Tang (620-907) dynasties, some relatively large political entities emerged
in western China, such as the tribal alliances of Dangchang ÌX©÷, Dengzhi ¾H¦Ü, Dangxiang ÄÒ¶µ and Tuyuhun ¦R¨¦´ý, and the Tufan ¦R¿» (the Tibetan Kingdom, also pronounces
as Tubo). In Chinese records, the
majority of the people under these regimes were the Qiang, Qiang ren ªÊ¤H or zhu Qiang ½ÑªÊ
(various Qiang tribes) (Figure 3.2).
The rise of the
Tibetan Kingdom in the 7th century is especially noteworthy. The rapid eastward
expansion of the Kingdom caused a series of confrontations with Tang China
along the eastern fringe of the Tibetan Plateau; this was a belt zone,
extending from southern Kansu southward to northern Yunnan, whose inhabitants
had been identified by the ancient Chinese as the Qiang. From the mid-7th
century to the 8th century, the Tibetan Kingdom conquered almost all of this
belt and many of the tribal confederacies of the Qiang, such as Dangxiang,
Yangtong ¦Ï¦P,
Dangchang and Dengzhi fell as her victims (Figure 3.3).
After the
collapse of the Tibetan Kingdom in the 9th century, and even after the rise and
fall of the Western Xia Kingdom (1038-1227) whose inhabitants were mainly
Dangxiang Qiang, the influence of Tibetan culture persisted in this peripheral
zone. This is because most of the areas in this zone were still controlled and
ruled by local chieftains who were (or ascribed to be) descendants of the
nobility or generals of the previous Tibetan Kingdom. And more important, Lama
Buddhism, in which Tibetan culture was rooted, spread throughout this
peripheral zone during the Yuan (1280-1368) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties. As
a result, from the Song dynasty (960-1279) on, especially during the Ming and
Qing periods, the most common ethnic label Chinese gave to the natives in this
zone became fan µf (Figure 3.4). This ethnic
label referred to the people of Tufan, and to barbarians.
Thus, we may say
that the rise and eastward expansion of the Tibetan political and cultural
power in the west, and the concomitant confrontation with China along the Qiang
belt, altered the Chinese concept toward non-Han people in this belt. From this time on, even its
geographic position did not change much, this western belt zone as an ethnic
boundary in the Chinese mind ceased to be maintained by the sense of otherness
toward the Qiang but rather by the sense of otherness toward the Fan
(Tibetans). This change was also illustrated by the name of a new frontier
town, Linfan Á{µf
(literally adjoining Fan) of the Tang dynasty, which was located near the
abandoned city of Linqiang Á{ªÊ
(adjoining Qiang) of the Later Han dynasty (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). The senses of
otherness maintained by the concept of Qiang and by that of Fan in the Chinese
mind were similar but different; since the historical memories behind these two
ethnic labels are different. For the Han Chinese the Qiang represented a blurry
ethnic boundary and the Fan a more clearly defined one. As more and more
Tibetanized people [2] in the west were classified
by Chinese as the Fan, a sharpened ethnic boundary delineating the concept of
the Fan was gradually substituted for the blurry one in most places along the
old Qiang belt.
There were still
two other situations that caused people in the Qiang belt of the Later Han to
gradually drop from this ethnic category. The first is the Sinicization of the
land and the people. In the northern part of this belt, this situation occurred
in the areas occupied by the Dangchang Qiang and later, the Western Xia Kingdom
in Gansu (Ran, Li, and Zhou 1984: 179-90). In the central part of this belt,
the same process occurred in Tianquan ¤Ñ¥þ and Yajiang ¶®¦¿ areas in western Sichuan, an area whose
inhabitants had been known as the ¡§blue-clothes Qiang.¡¨ From the Tang dynasty
on, these areas became the lands of imperial China and its inhabitants became
registered civilians (Torrance 1920: 5-12; Ran, Li, and Zhou 1984: 100-101).
Second, when the Chinese had better knowledge about the people, they
distinguished the Yi ¦i
in southern Sichuan and Northern Yunnan, who had earlier been identified as
Maoniu Qiang, from the category of the Qiang. From the Tang dynasty on, as the
result of the rise of the Nanzhao «n¶@ (738-902) and the Dali ¤j²z kingdoms (937-1252 ) in the south, the
Chinese had better motives and chances to acquire knowledge concerning people
within and surrounding these kingdoms. It is in this political context that
there came to be a certain number of official documents, personal travel notes
to describe the non-Chinese living in southern Sichuan and northern Yunnan;
this new ethnographic knowledge led the Chinese to distinguish various branches
of the Yi in this area from the category of the Qiang (Figure 3.4).
From the 14th to
the 19th century, even in some rare cases the terms Qiang rong ªÊ¦¥
(Qiang barbarians), zhu Qiang ½ÑªÊ (many Qiang tribes), and more
frequently Fan and Yi, were still
applied to a wide range of western non-Han people in a generic sense, but only
the Fan living in the upper Min River Valley and the nearby Beichuan region
were recorded as Qiang, Qiang ren or Qiang min ªÊ¥Á
(Qiang civilians). Of particular note is that during this period the Han always
applied the term Qiang min to the
more sinicized natives from Maozhou Z¦{ to Guanxian Ä鿤
who were registered civilians of local Chinese governments,
while they used the Fan, sheng Fan ¥Íµf and Fan Qiang µfªÊ
to refer to the less sinicized people in nearby Songpan, Diexi Å|·Ë and Heishui ¶Â¤ô (MSL 1382.6, 1389.3, 1433.10, 1436.6, 1439.7). Nevertheless, in the
historical documents of the Ming and Qing dynasties, Fan was doubtlessly the most common identification for the people
living in the upper Min River Valley and Beichuan area.
From the 16th
century on, a large number of Han immigrants or refugees fled into the upper
Min River Valley and Beichuan areas. They were storekeepers, merchants,
artisans, and civil or military officers living in towns, or farmers marrying
native women and staying in villages. By the latter part of the 19th century, the
Han-style Buddhist and Daoist religious practices and the Confucian ideology of
ancestral worship became an inseparable part of the natives¡¦ lives. It is at least from
this time that many of the native leaders and leading families assumed Han
origins while other assumed Tibetan origins (MZZ, 3; LFTZ, 4).
The Rma
of the Upper Min River Valley
Why have the natives of the
upper Min River Valley and Beichuan areas (Figure 3.5), and these people only, become
in the eyes of the Chinese the Qiang nationality? The non-Han people of the
Qiang belt have been gradually removed from this category as they were
Sinicized, Tibetanized, or classified by the Han into the category of the Yi.
Looking at ¡§the
past¡¨ (historical
memories) both in writing and in oral tradition, and from ethnographic data, we
know that both the Sinicizing and Tibetanizing processes have occurred in the
upper Min River Valley and Beichuan areas. Nevertheless, as the following
paragraphs show, a sort of local identity―rma identity―has distinguished each
regional human group from their more Sinicized or Tibetanized neighbors.
The Qiang today are mountain dwellers. A fortress village, zhai ¹ë, composed of 30 to 100 households in
general is the basic social unit beyond the household. An average of two to
five fortress villages make up a village cluster (cun §ø).
The inhabitants of fortress village or village cluster have close contact in
social life. Again, several fortress villages or village clusters in a small
valley, known in local Chinese as gou ·¾, along a mountain stream,
comprise a wider society. In these small valleys, people cultivate narrow
fluvial plains along creeks or mountain terraces, hunt animals or collect
mushrooms and herbs (for food or medicine) in the neighboring woods, and herd
yaks and horses on the mountain-top pastures.
The houses in the fortress
village are built of stone and wood standing two or three stories high. All the
houses are built together for the purpose of defense. In some village all
houses face inwards, while the back walls, which are connected, form the outer
rampart. The symbol and most outstanding feature of a fortress village are its
defense towers. These towers were built of stone of about 15 to 20 feet across
at the base, tapering to about half of this size at the top. Many exceed 100
feet. According to the natives, all these defense towers were built at least 80
years ago. The memories of the endless blood feuds between fortress villages,
village clusters and gou valleys, and
of the wars against Chinese troops and bandits are still fresh for the older
generations. The geographical isolation, the relatively autonomous economy and
the fear of outsiders, all make the fortress village a confined, solitary social
unit. This isolation also resulted in the tremendous variation in the local
dialects.
From
the linguistic point of view, all modern Qiang people speak the Qiang language,
which is a member of the Tibeto-Burman language family. However, for the people
themselves, the local dialects are extremely varied; as suggested by the local
proverb: ¡§our language cannot go far.¡¨ Thus, the
language of rGyalrong Tibetans was once the lingua franca of the leading class
in villages ruled by headmen of Tibetan connections or origins. Nevertheless,
now the ¡§Han language¡¨
(Sichuan dialect) is the most common tool of communication among Qiang people
from different places. In some villages near main highway along the Min River
Valley, the ¡§Han
language¡¨
is the only language used.
The Han and
native languages, along with the social memories each contained, provide two
different social contexts within which the people built their identities. In
the context of their own language, the concept of ma, rma, or its sound-alikes is the most common
source of identity. In the context of the Han language, they identify
themselves as Qiang zu (Qiang
nationality). Now they equate the rma
(or its sound-alikes) with the Qiang zu,
but most of them also admit that they had never heard of the ethnic label Qiang zu, or even the Qiang, before 1950. Elders who live in
mountain villages along the Heisui River can still remember that, the rma (or its sound-alikes) represented
only the people of their own valley, by which the tshep (literally the barbarians upstream)[3] and the erh (the crafty Chinese downstream) were excluded. Thus the
dwellers of a small valley who called themselves rma, were also identified by the people upstream as erh and by the people downstream as tshep. Meanwhile, it seems that not all
dwellers in a fortress village, a village cluster or a gou valley hold the same opinion about who should be included or
excluded from the category of rma; it
was a matter of experiences interacting with outsiders and knowledge about the
outside world. Therefore, the concept of rma
changed from generation to generation.
In the Beichuan
area, before the 1950s some families in mountain villages might have been aware
of their non-Han origins since they had always been called by the people
downstream as manzi ÆZ¤l; that
is, barbarians. However, again, most of them had never heard of the Qiang.
Before the 1970s it was difficult to distinguish the manzi and the Han in some areas. From the lower Baicao River or the
lower Qingpian River upstream, villagers always declared that their village or
family was of Han origin, and all villages upstream were of the manzi. In fact, all these villages were
practically identical in ways of subsistence, daily life, religion, and
language (Chinese of Sichuan dialect). And most families kept a genealogical
book that demonstrates their Han origins by tracing their motherland to Huguang
´ò¼s, or more
specifically, Xiaogan §µ·P
county in Macheng ³Â«°,
Hubei province ¾ a factual or imagined homeland commonly
claimed by the Han Chinese in Sichuan.
Thus, before the
1950s and before the concept of nation or nationality (minzu) entered these areas, not only did the identity of the Qiang zu not exist, but the distinction
between the Han and non-Han was also obscure. In the upper Min River Valley,
even the concept of ¡§us¡¨ represented by the term rma (or its sound-alikes) was also a
relative one; there were no geographically or culturally defined boundaries
between the rma and tshep, and the erh. Thus, the concept of rma
illustrates a relatively isolated but flexible self-identity of the local
people.
Now it seems
clear why the natives of the upper Min River Valley and Beichuan areas were the
last Qiang people in the mind of the Chinese. Obviously, from the Tang dynasty
on, these areas have been sandwiched between Tibet (Tubo) and China politically
as well as culturally. The confined natural environment and the self-sustaining
valley economy discouraged cross-valley unification in any political or
cultural form; these people could hardly reach a common identity and political
unity to fight against the Tibetan or Chinese invaders. Consequently, during
the late Imperial and early Republic period, the cultural traits and political tendencies
of the valley-dwellers in the area manifested themselves in a picture of
continuous variation from the more Tibetan-like communities in the west down to
the more Han-like communities in the east, thus becoming the last blurry
boundary between the Tibetan and the Han Chinese.
The History and Ethnography of the Qiang
Nationality from a Chinese Viewpoint
In the eyes of the Han
Chinese, the non-Han living along the western edges were ¡§others.¡¨ They were, and in a sense
still are, a kind of ethnic boundary of the Chinese. For thousands of years,
the Chinese have maintained and strengthened these ethnic boundaries by
describing the alienness and barbarism of the non-Han in ethnographic writings,
and recording the cost of endless raids launched by these barbarians throughout
history. As I have argued elsewhere (1997a: 316-18), throughout the process of
ethnic boundary-forming, a great degree of cultural variation existed among the
geographically as well as socially distinguished population who identified
themselves as the Zhongguo ren ¤¤°ê¤H, literally the people of the
Central Kingdom; for this reason, a series of alienating boundaries were always
needed to strengthen the unity of all the people within these boundaries. In
this boundary-keeping tradition, there was no need for the Chinese literati to
write a history with a common belief of origins for all the ¡§people of the Central Kingdom.¡¨ History, and the common
belief of origins, was written only to reinforce the coherence of the upper
class or leading families.
Scholars
specializing in the study of nationalism and ethnicity have pointed out the
crucial role and narrative characteristics of history in constructing a modern nation
(Smith 1986; Tonkin, McDonald and Chapman 1989; Silverman and Gulliver 1992;
Duara 1995). During the late imperial period, Han Chinese literati were
startled by the political as well as economic threats from western powers of
commercial imperialism on the one hand, and stimulated by the concept of nation
and the underlying principles of social Darwinism on the other. Thus, a very
important work in their save-the-country-project was building a Chinese nation
by reconstructing history and rediscovering the ethnography of the people. In
an important work, Prasenjit Duara (1995) has shown how the Chinese literati
adopted Enlightenment History in the process of creating a Chinese nation.
Duara suggested two very important purposes of lineal history: to glorify the
ancient character of the nation, and to emphasize the unprecedented nature, the
modernity, of the nation-state (1995: 27-30).
In all ¡§history¡¨ aimed at cohering people,
¡§origins¡¨ always are decisive. The common belief of origins, no matter whether
it involves a creative ancestor, a legendary homeland, or an important event,
creates attachments among a people. This phenomenon is found among various
cultural backgrounds, and is well known to students of ethnicity. In China, ¡§to find a common ancestor¡¨ has been an important
discourse in the process of nation-building during the late imperial era. In a
1998 essay, Shen Sung-chiao pointed out that the collective memory of ¡§the descendants of Huang Di ¶À«Ò (Emperor Huang or Yellow
Emperor)¡¨
now widely held by Chinese all over the world was created and modified through
a series of arguments proposed by revolutionists and reformists in late
imperial China. As he suggests, the legendary Huang Di, who had been a symbol
of royal or dynastic tradition, was chosen by the Han literati as ancestor of
all members of the newly created nation ¾ Zhonghua minzu. This discourse included
the themes: (1) whether or not the northern-frontier people, such as
Manchurians and Mongolians, were the offspring of Huang Di; (2) whether the
nation should be built on the commemoration of Confucius (cultural nation),
instead of that of Huang Di (racial nation); (3) if Huang Di¡¦s offspring included some
non-Han people, whether the Emperor¡¦s direct heir, the Han
Chinese, were superior to the non-Han descendants of the Emperor. All these
discussions reflect necessary steps in the process of nation-building:
strengthening primordial ties among the people by commemorating a common
ancestor, modifying the boundary, and stratifying the inner groups.
After the
establishment of the Republic, supposedly a nation-state, in 1911, the project
of creating and solidifying the Chinese nation went on. The nation, Zhonghua minzu, now included the Han and
all the people who had been treated by the Han as peripheral barbarians. For
the Han Chinese, the traditional position of peripheral people as ethnic
boundaries defining ¡§the
people of Central Kingdom¡¨
was still the same. Nevertheless, they now became part of the nation, and the ¡§Central Kingdom¡¨ and its ¡§boundaries¡¨ could be put together. This
work has been conducted mainly by rewriting history and ethnography of the
people concerned. It is in this context that much of the history and
ethnography of the Qiang have been produced or reconstructed in the past 50
years.
In the period
from 1911 to the mid-1940s, the leaders of the Republic confined their
attention to four minority nationalities: the Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, and
the Hui; the numerous minorities of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou were basically
ignored. These southwestern people were becoming assimilated into the Han, and
were encouraged to do so (Mackerras 1994: 59-60). The Qiang min or Qiang ren in
northwestern Sichuan, who had already been Sinicized to a certain extent before
that time, was one such case. As a result, the Han literati made little effort
to study the cultural uniqueness of the people. This explains why the earliest
ethnographic field research concerning the Qiang was all conducted by western
scholars and missionaries.
During the second
decade of the 20th century, Rev. Thomas Torrance began his work among the
population in the upper Min River Valley. He identified these people as Qiang
and reconstructed their history from the Dayu ¤j¬ê (Great Yu) of the Xia dynasty
(presumably 23rd-18th century B.C.) down to the Qing dynasty (Torrance 1920:
4-14). However, believing that the Qiang were monotheists, he further suggested
that the Qiang were descendants of the ancient Israelites (1932). This
conclusion was obviously driven by evolutionist and diffusionist ideologies
prevailing among ethnologists of his era. From 1925 to 1948, another western
scholar, David Crockett Graham, made a number of field trips to the upper Min
River Valley region. As his predecessor, he identified the people as Qiang and
constructed a lineal history of the people by combining all the historical data
quoted from Chinese historians¡¦ work. But he also indicated
that the Qiang were not monotheists; and he observed that, accepting the
teachings of Torrance, some of the Qiang people had come to believe that they
were the descendants of the ancient Israelites (Graham 1958: 98-101).
Two points here
are noteworthy. First, both the work of Torrance and Graham were among the
people living in Maozhou Z¦{,
Weizhou «Â¦{, and
Lifan ²zµf. We know
that almost all the people in these regions had become Qiang min (registered Qiang civilians) during the Ming and the Qing
dynasties; this explains why they were recognized by both scholars as the
Qiang. Second, for the customs and religion of the Qiang, Torrance¡¦s description stressed its
uniqueness, as he believed the people were a ¡§unique race¡¨ (1937: 36). However,
according to Graham¡¦s description these Qiang cultures were a
mixture of the Chinese culture and their own, as he had noticed that the Qiang
were being gradually absorbed by the Chinese (1958: 102). Nevertheless, Graham
also noticed that there was great variation in language and customs among the
Qiang of different localities (1958: 101).
Starting in the
1930s, several Chinese scholars had proceeded ethnographic as well as
linguistic fieldwork in the upper Min River Valley. Among them, Hu Jianmin was
probably the earliest. By describing the religions, customs, and economic life
of the people, he also admitted that it would be difficult to distinguish which
were the native traditions and which were those being influenced by the Chinese
and Tibetan cultures (Hu 1944: 39). The vague boundary of cultural
representation, especially in native dress, between the Qiang and the Han, and
the rGyalrong Tibetans at this time was also illustrated by the report of the
Frontier Service Team of Chinese Colleges. As the report stated: ¡§The Qiang¡¦s dress, whether that of men
or women, has no special form. Therefore it is impossible to identify the Qiang
by their dress¡¨ (Jiaoyubu Meng Zang Jiaoyu Si
1943: 23). The report further suggested: ¡§since all cultural phenomenon
are identical with those of (the Han of) the inner land and the differences are
trivial, there is no way to identify the Qiang except by their language¡¨ (1943: 25).
Meanwhile, the
Qiang in Hu Jianmin¡¦s study was not merely a small
group of contemporary people living in northwestern Sichuan; He connected them
historically with all the Di-Qiang minzu
¥ÂªÊ¥Á±Ú ¾ a huge ethnic group, which as he
believed, originated from the Qiang, Di or Di-Qiang in ancient times [4] and whose branches then become
many non-Han peoples widely spread in western or southwestern China (Hu 1944).
He further connected the Di-Qiang minzu
with the Tibetan; the relationship between the two people, he believed, was
physically but not linguistically proven (Hu 1944: 43).
Whether scholars
were impressed by the uniqueness of Qiang culture or confused by its hybrid
nature, all academic quests for the Qiang at this time demonstrate that there
was an ideal type of nation commonly
held by all authors: the nation is a
group of people who share common language, cultural and physical traits, and
are descendants of a physically, linguistically and culturally homogeneous
proto-group. Thus the field researchers of that time tried to find the
physical, linguistic, and cultural proto-types of the Qiang, and therefore
could delineate the ethnic boundary of the people. Even though they failed to
find a normative Qiang culture, their attempts to do so, and the data they
recorded in these quests, have reinforced the concept of the Qiang nationality
both for the Han and the natives.
In contrast to
ethnographers who could only give a vague concept of the Qiang through
describing the native culture, linguists provided a much more clearly defined human
category of the people through linguistic investigation and classifications.
Thanks to the contributions of many linguists, among whom Wen Yu was the first
Chinese scholar in this field, the Qiang language found a place as a distinct
member in the Tibeto-Burman family of the Sino-Tibetan language phylum. For
many scholars, not only did the specific language provide a ¡§scientific¡¨ way to
identify the Qiang people, but it also delineated the hierarchical structure of
linguistic relationships (Qiang language ®
Tibeto-Burman family ® Sino-Tibetan phylum) and
encouraged them to connect the Qiang with wider human categories historically
as well as culturally. Therefore, while the Qiang people are believed to be a
unique ethnic group, on a higher level they are also part of a collective
nation, Di-Qiang minzu, corresponding
to a specific linguistic group. And on the highest level, Di-Qiang minzu are part of the super nation, Zhonghua minzu.
Nevertheless,
ethnographers and linguists did not create the ethnic category of the Di-Qiang minzu; it was the invention of
historians. As I have mentioned, the Han Chinese have a long and abundant
historical memory concerning the Qiang. Therefore, in the eyes of Han Chinese,
the history of the Qiang has always been much more attractive than the
ethnography of the people. In 1905, a young revolutionary, Liu Shipei ¼B®v°ö, published a book entitled Zhongguo Minzu Zhi ¤¤°ê¥Á±Ú§Ó (History of the Chinese Race), intended to awaken the Chinese nation;
the Chinese nation was equivalent in his point of view with the Han race (Liu
1905). The Di-Qiang zhongzu ¥ÂªÊºØ±Ú (Di-Qiang race) that appeared
in this book were a branch of Tibetans whose descendants had been partially
absorbed into the Han race (Liu 1905: 8-9). After the establishment of the
Republic, historical studies of the Chinese nation and nationalities came to be
a major part of the project of nation-building. In these works, the Qiang or Di-Qiang minzu represent a large group
of people whose offspring are now scattered among the Han, the Tibetans, and
many southwestern non-Han peoples (Lin H. 1934; Lü S. 1934; Lü Z. 1948). Nevertheless,
during this period the Qiang or Di-Qiang
minzu seemed to be a historical concept; very few scholars connected them
with the contemporary people living in the upper Min River Valley.[5]
In 1949, the
Chinese Communist Party came to power and established a new regime called the
People¡¦s Republic of China (PRC).
Like its predecessor, the new regime asserted authority over all nationality
areas and stressed the unity of the Chinese nation. But unlike the former
republic, the new regime had more positive policies toward nationality issues.
At first, the equality and autonomous rights of all nationalities were guaranteed
by the Constitution of the PRC. Subsequently, identification of nationalities
was carried out over all of China. Until 1979, a total of 55 minority
nationalities had been formally recognized by the state. Along the old Qiang
belt, the identification or distinction of nationalities basically followed the
Chinese concepts of Qiang, Fan, and Yi (Figure 3.6). Most of the people in this
belt who had been labeled as fan now
were classified as Zang zu (Tibetans), and became the eastern-most portion of a
total of 4,593,330 Zang zu. The people at the southern end of this belt who had
been labeled Yi (to avoid its
barbaric hint the character ¦i
was now replaced by a homophonous character ÂU) were identified as the Yi zu and became
the northern-most portion of a total of 6,572,173 Yi people. The Qiang, a
nationality not found elsewhere, comprise only 198,252 people. Even though the
number of Qiang was small, because of the wealth of materials on the Qiang in
Chinese archives, through historical imagination it was possible to connect the
Zang, the Yi, and many southwestern Di/Qiang-connected nationalities with the
Han Chinese.
In this new
environment, the history of the Qiang nationality became a focus of historical
attention. During the 1970s and 1980s, many leading scholars, such as Gu
Jiegang ÅU¾eè and
Ma Changshou °¨ªø¹Ø,
engaged in this study. The result was a series of reconstructed histories that
not only connect all the Qiang from the Shang dynasty down to the present, but
also link a wide range of northwestern and southwestern nationalities, through
their Di-Qiang connections, with the Han (Gu 1981; Ma 1984; Ran, Li, and Zhou
1984). A folk story concerning a war between the natives and the Geji people (Geji ren ¤à°ò¤H),
adopted from the Qiang in the Wenchuan and Lixian areas, was interpreted by
scholars as evidence for the Qiang¡¦s
southward migration (Lin X. 1983; Ma 1984; Ran, Li, and Zhou 1984). This folk
evidence further connects the Qiang today in northwestern Sichuan with the
lineal history of the Qiang or Di-Qiang
minzu reconstructed from China¡¦s
historical memories. Thus it became common knowledge among the literati of the
Han and of many nationalities that the Qiang were the descendants of the
legendary Yan Di ª¢«Ò
(the Emperor Yan) and Dayu, and, though once a very populous and powerful
nationality, were scattered over various places after being defeated.
Identifying the
Emperor Yan of the Jiang «¸
clan with the ancestor of the Qiang or Di-Qiang
minzu is especially crucial.[6] In Chinese legendary history the
status of the Emperor Yan was twofold: according to some sources he was an
ancient leader rivaling the Emperor Huang for leadership (SJ 1.1; DWSJ), but
another source states that the two rival emperors were actually brothers (GY 10). The Emperor Huang (Huang Di) was
commemorated by the Han Chinese as their common ancestor in the nation-building
scheme during the late Qing and early Republican periods. At the same time,
Emperor Yan, the defeated brother of Emperor Huang, has been collectively
reconstructed in national history (minzu
shi ¥Á±Ú¥v) as
the ancestor of many non-Han nationalities, especially those that could be
connected to the Di-Qiang minzu. Thus
the term Yan Huang zisun ª¢¶À¤l®], literally the descendants of
the Emperor Yan and Emperor Huang, has become a synonym for the Zhonghua minzu including all Han and
non-Han peoples; it is a historical metaphor confirming the brotherhood of all
nations/nationalities. It is also a historical metaphor distinguishing
offspring of the conqueror from those of the conquered. This explains why even
though the Qiang today are a minor population its history is crucial for
Chinese historians.
History and Ethnography of the Qiang
Nationality from the Native Viewpoint
The Qiang today are not only a
non-Han category in the eyes of the Han Chinese, but also an ethnic group in
their own right, since they identify themselves as Qiang zu (the Qiang
nationality) and believe that they share a common language, culture, and
history. This development occurred mainly after 1949.
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the
administration of the KMT government, and the scholarship of foreign and
Chinese scholars in the first half of the century, contributed to the formation
of the ethnic self-awareness of the Qiang. However, during my own fieldwork, I
have been told by many old people that they had not heard about the Qiang and
had not thought of themselves as such until the Han Chinese said they were in
and after the 1950s. Obviously, during the late Qing and early Republic, the
ethnonym Qiang min was merely an
official terminology recorded in writing documents; in daily life, they were
labeled by the people upstream as erh
and by the people downstream as tshep,
sbie or ferh, and by the Han Chinese, manzi
(barbarians). Further, while they were young, the autonym rma (or local variants) ¾ a native notion of ¡§our people¡¨¾ denoted only the people of their own
valley, small or large. Needless to say, no one had heard anything about the ¡§descendants of Israelites¡¨.
With the coming of the
People¡¦s Republic, the situation altered radically. Besides investigating and
classifying nationalities, the new government introduced a series of policies
toward minority nationalities. These policies have varied from time to time and
certain projected goals have never been achieved, but the prohibition of
discrimination and economic subsidies for minority nationalities are attractive
enough to make minority status welcome. Thus in the Qiang areas, not only
previous ¡§barbarians¡¨ (manzi) were willing to accept minority status with the assigned
label Qiang, but also many people who had previously declared themselves as Han
now made every effort to find their Qiang connections in order to acquire this
non-Han status. Against this background, more and more people in the upper Min
River Valley and Beichuan region became member of the Qiang nationality. In
addition, after being taught about their ¡§past¡¨ in China's social/historical
memory through school education, they began to select, interpret or invent
their own cultures and history.
For the Qiang
people, the most serious obstacle in building their common identity is the lack
of a native writing system and a common language. Starting from the mid-1980s,
after receiving state approval, Qiang literati began to create their own
writing system (using a Romanized alphabet) and to compile a dictionary of the
Qiang language, based on the standardized Qugu ¦±¨¦ dialect. Since 1994, more teachers who
have learned the standard Qiang language and the newly invented writing system
have been sent to mountain villages of all places. Even though it is not true
that all Qiang people can communicate with each other with the standardized
native language, it is now common sense among the people that they are speaking
the ¡§same
language.¡¨
This common sense is created by linguists¡¦ fieldwork and simplified
publications.
Besides the
common language and writing, the highlights of the newly selected or invented
Qiang culture are the new year festival of the Qiang calendar, the salong (guozhuang ÁçÉÜ
in Chinese) singing dance, the national dress, and a folk story concerning the
Qiang-Ge war. In the 1910s, Torrance noticed that the Qiang in the Wenchuan area
celebrated the festival of the Ox-king (niuwanghui
¤û¤ý·|) in the first
day of the tenth month of the lunar year. However, believing that the Qiang
were descendants of Israelites, he suggested that the day is actually a ¡¥new year festival of the Qiang
calendar¡¦ instead of the Sinicized
festival of the Ox-king (1920: 29-35). It is questionable whether the people
Torrance studied had the custom of a new year festival as their tradition.
First, elder aborigines I met told me that they celebrated a festival of the
Ox-king, but the most cheerful day in a year was the Chinese new year, the first day of the lunar calendar. In
some less Sinicized villages people say directly that the festival of the
Ox-king is a Han custom that did not previously exist. Furthermore, in the
natives¡¦ concept of time, according to
the native language, there are only two periods in a year, one equivalent to
spring and summer, the other, autumn and winter; their concept of months was
borrowed from the Han Chinese, and so is that of the first day of a new year.
Nevertheless, in 1987, the autonomous government of Aba Prefecture officially
pronounced the first day of the tenth month to be the new year festival of the
Qiang calendar. From that year on, four Qiang counties¢wMaoxian, Wenchuan, Lixian and Beichuan¢whave taken turns hosting the official
activities of the day for all the Qiang people. Young people enjoy the
opportunity to sing and dance with their friends from different localities, but
the elders are not interested. They even complained that it is an insult to
impose the festival of the Ox on the Qiang people.
The most
important activity in the new year festival of the Qiang calendar as well as in
other celebratory events is the salong
singing dances ¾ a kind of group dance that is commonly
believed to be shared between the Tibetans and the Qiang in Aba Prefecture.
Nevertheless, natives in some regions admit that they did not have this
tradition until young people brought it back from towns in recent years. In
some fortress-villages (in northern Maoxian and southern Songpan), while young
people dance salong, elders perform nisa instead ¾
another kind of group dance with more of a ritual or religious sense. It is
noteworthy that very few people, if any, know the meaning of salong songs even in villages that had
practiced this tradition. In these villages, elders still remember that, before
the standardized salong was
introduced to the people, the salong
dances varied from village to village, and from valley to valley. Since 1989,
under the support of the autonomous government of Aba Prefecture, both the
standardized salong of the Qiang and
that of the rGyalrong Tibetans were gradually introduced to all the people. Salong dances now are widely practiced
in every official or private celebration; it is not only a symbol of the Qiang
culture but also a symbol of unification of the rGyalrong Tibetans and the
Qiang in Aba Prefecture.
While performing salong, women wear their traditional
national dress of very fine, delicate, colorful, and varied embroidery patterns
striking contrast to the impression the Qiang¡¦s dress made upon early
investigators, which was always described as dull, plain and ethnically
indistinguishable (Torrance 1937: 39-41; Graham 1958: 20-21; Jiaoyubu Meng
Zhang Jiaoyu Si 1943: 23; Hu 1944: 39). Furthermore, early investigators
noticed that the practice of embroidery seemed to be flourishing in some more
Sinicized or Tibetanized Qiang areas; thus they suspected that the Qiang might
have borrowed the art of embroidery from their neighboring Han or Tibetans (Hu
1944: 40; Graham 1958: 21). Now embroidery is commonly believed and proclaimed
to be a national hallmark of the Qiang nationality. Therefore, by 1996,
Wenchuan was assigned by the state the name of Zhongguo Minjian Yishu Qiangxiu zhi Xiang ¤¤°ê¥Á¶¡ÃÀ³NªÊ¸¤§¶m, ¡§Home of the Qiang¡¦s embroidery of Chinese folk
art¡¨ (Bianji
weiyuanhui 1997). I have mentioned elsewhere that the changes of Qiang women¡¦s
dress in this century illustrated a process of fashioning minority ethnic
identity (Wang 1998).
For
many scholars studying Qiang culture, the most interesting character is
probably duangong ºÝ¤½ ¾
exorcist, medicine man, and storyteller. During the Cultural Revolution, duangong and the religion they practiced
almost disappeared. But, in the 1980s, as the sense of ethnic identity among
China¡¦s nationalities sharply increased, the story of the Qiang-Ge war adopted
from duangong oracles and the related
white stone worship have become a symbol of the Qiang culture. The story has
been reinterpreted by Han scholars to relate the Qiang in northwest China
during the Han dynasty to the people in the upper Min River Valley and other
southwestern regions today; thus a lineal history of the Qiang or Di-Qiang minzu was completed. The Qiang
literati are willing to accept from the story that they were once a strong and
warlike people, and, most important, are the mainstream exemplars of the Di-Qiang minzu today including their
populous neighbors ¾ the Zang (Tibetans) and the Yi.
Therefore, the story of the Qiang-Ge war and the subsequent Qiang ¡§history¡¨ have become a crucial part of
recently published work by Qiang literati. However, for most villagers in
mountain fortresses, since they could neither learn what duangong sang in the past, nor acquire the story from books in
Chinese today, the story of the Qiang-Ge war is basically foreign. Meanwhile,
the history has been simplified in oral tradition as ¡§the Qiang used to be a strong
and warlike people but dispersed in all directions after being defeated¡¨ (Wang 1997b: 142). Therefore
it is a common belief among the people that, beyond the Qiang in Aba Prefecture
and Beichuan areas, there are, or must be, some sub-branches scattered in
different places around the whole country, or even around the world.
While the story
of the Qiang-Ge war has been adopted by Han scholars to construct a lineal
history of the Qiang, the same story has also been reinterpreted or rewritten
by natives to fit their own interests and historical mentality. That is, as the
story said, after the war the god Mubita, or the winning hero Paigo, dispatched
Qiang soldiers to different valleys to establish their own fortress villages (QZGSJ: 26-27). In one new and popular
version of the story (Luo Shize 1983; Ran, Li, and Zhou 1984: 209), the nine
places Paigo¡¦s sons (nine brothers) had ruled included all the Qiang autonomous
counties and major towns today (Songpan, Maoxian, Wenchuan, Lixian, Mianchi,
Beichuan), and the place (Heisui ¶Â¤ô)
its inhabitants are believed to be the Qiang according to Qiang literati¡¦s linguistic knowledge, and
the places (Niangziguan ®Q¤lÃö,
Guanxian Ä鿤) that are believed to have
been Qiang areas according to Qiang literati¡¦s historical knowledge. I have
mentioned elsewhere that ¡§brotherhood
stories¡¨ ¾ which attribute origins of closely bound
families, lineages, or villages in an area to the simultaneous arrival to the
region and subsequent dispersion of brothers ¾
were, and in some areas still are, a kind of history in natives¡¦ minds (Wang 1999). By telling
these histories, the brotherhood among all families, lineages, and villages in
an area could be strengthened. Thus, we find two kinds of historical mentality
in the story of the Qiang-Ge war and its interpretations. On the one hand, the
story as part of a lineal history connects the Qiang and other Di-Qiang nationalities with the Han
through which ethnic relations of majority-versus-minority, or of
superor-versus-inferor, are revealed. On the other hand, the story as part of a
structural history of the coming and separation of brothers connects all the
Qiang people in different locations; and, in this historical scenario, all
descendants of ¡§the
brothers¡¨
are equal.
By
telling the story of the Qiang-Ge war and providing a historical
interpretation, the Qiang literati built up their self-image as the strongest
opponents of the Han. Meanwhile, by acquiring other ancestors in Chinese
historical documents, a historical role as the Han¡¦s brother and savior has also
been constructed. These ancestors include the legendary Emperor Yan ª¢«Ò, the Great Yu ¤j¬ê, and Li Bing §õ¦B of the Qin dynasty, as well as the
heroine Fan Lihua ¼Ô±ùªá
of the Tang dynasty. The Emperor Yan in the Chinese legend was the brother of
Emperor Huang, and also the inventor of agriculture. Both Great Yu and Li Bing
were known as heroes who harnessed the rivers and saved people from flood and
drought. The heroine Fan Lihua, daughter of a non-Chinese warlord, helped her
husband, a Chinese general in the Tang dynasty, to defeat the invasion of the
Xifan (western barbarians), namely, the Tibetans. All these legendary or
historical characters are recognized, for various reasons, by the Qiang
literati their ancestors. The Great Yu, the founder of the Hsia dynasty, has
been most often commemorated by the educated Qiang people; there is even a good
deal of propaganda and academic debate among Qiang intellectuals in Wenchuan
and Beichuan over the birthplace of the sage-emperor (Wang 1997b: 144-45, 152).
In the natives¡¦
construction of their own culture and history the Qiang literati have played an
important role. Thus, a few remarks on the general backgrounds and
characteristics of these people is in order. The Qiang literati in this chapter
refer to natives who have acquired knowledge by learning Chinese language and
writing and therefore became teachers, public servants of autonomous
governments, or holders of other administrative or academic positions in
various levels of government. Their privileged social position comes from their
role as intermediaries between their own people and the state or the Han
Chinese. The emergence of these people as a social class is quite new. During
the Qing and Republican periods, even though a few prosperous native families might
have the opportunity to send their young to study Chinese, this did not create
a group of literati confident enough to declare a native identity; nor could
they hold a prestigious position in Chinese society. A ¡§learned barbarian¡¨ was still a ¡§barbarian.¡¨ Therefore, it was not until
the state ensured the equality of all nationalities and provided minority
nationalities with economic subsidies, educational opportunities, as well as
leniency in the number of children allowed, that the Qiang became a popular
identity. And, it was not until state education extended deep into all mountain
villages and educated young were able to serve in autonomous governments or
schools that the Qiang literati became spokesmen for their people.
Nevertheless, the
history of the Qiang in Chinese social memory was basically unknown to natives
in this area before this century; thus, only natives well versed in Chinese are
able to select suitable pasts from Chinese archives to construct their glorious
history. Moreover, mountain dwellers in this area traditionally identified
themselves with people in a relatively narrow world (a few villages or
valleys), as manifested in the traditional concept of rma. Therefore, only natives who are aware of their
minority-of-minority ethnic status through coming into contact with the outside
world feel the need to glorify their Qiang identity. Finally, the Qiang
nationality is presumably an inseparable part of the Chinese nation and the
communist state. Consequently, only educated natives serving in the state or
party system and acquainted with all these ideologies are in a position to
carefully establish and propagate their Qiang identity, and at the same time
avoid threatening the state or the unity of the nation.
From the Late Han to the Qing
period, the concept of the Qiang as a western ethnic boundary of the ancient
Chinese, first referring to a huge range of people in the west, gradually came
to denote only the non-Chinese people living in the upper Min River Valley and
Beichuan area. This process was the result of more and more western ¡§barbarians¡¨ becoming Chinese or being
classified by the Chinese into new ethnic categories. The history of the Qiang
is segnificant, serving as a bridge between many minority nationalities and the
Han in the past and the present, reconstructed mainly by Han intellectuals in
this century as part of a nation-building scheme. And I have described the
native movement of constructing a common language, writing, culture, and
history of the Qiang nationality, as well as the role of native literati in
this movement as receivers, interpreters, and propagators of their own history
and culture.
In conclusion, it
is important to elucidate some theoretical aspects of national identity
formation and the ¡§history¡¨ involved. In the study of history of nations,
explanations for the formation of a nation usually take one of two forms: ¡§how did the past create the
present,¡¨ or, ¡§how
did the present create the past?¡¨ The past in the former explanation always
involves ¡§what really happened,¡¨
and those in the second, ¡§the
one of selection, reconstruction, or imagination.¡¨ It is undeniable that the
single coherent past and the standardized explanation about the origin of a
group almost always result from political-economic power oppositions. But it is
also noteworthy that deconstructing the ¡§history¡¨ people created through
historical imagination raises the question: is it the anthropologists¡¦ or the historians¡¦ business to tell people under
study that the history they believe is wrong (Tonkin, McDonald, and Chapman
1989: 9)?
The
¡§fact-versus-fiction¡¨ also exists in the historical studies of Chinese nation
or nationalities. Most Chinese historians hold the present-in-the-past
explanation about national histories, of which all nationalities in China are
believed to be old and together form an inseparable national unit. Western
scholars, however, influenced by the trend of emphasizing the imaginary or
inventive nature of history and traditions in the formation of nations or
nationalities, now mostly favor the past-in-the-present explanation. The
Chinese nation and its nationalities are thus an entirely modern phenomenon
produced under the impetus of nationalism, and the related history is viewed as
a modern historical narrative.
My own opinion
falls in between because the meaning of the history of the Qiang is twofold: it
is a history of a minority nationality, and also a history of the Chinese in
respect to boundary formation and changes. In the former sense, my arguments
demonstrate that the formation of the Qiang nationality involved selected,
invented, or imagined aspects of history and culture. In the latter sense, if
we consider the history of the Qiang as a process of formation, expansion and
change of Chinese boundaries (and the Tibetan boundary as well), this chapter
illustrates how the past created the present, and underlines the continuity of
this history. However, the most important past that created the present
Han-Qiang relations is obviously not what really happened on the Qiang side but
how Chinese thought about their ethnic boundaries through the concept of the
Qiang. In other words, what has remained as a part of history is not the Qiang
nationality but a central-versus-periphery dynamic of human relations.
Scholars in
Chinese studies have noticed the progression of Chinese thought on national
identity from the traditionally cultural and hierarchical ideas of civilization
and territory (space) to the modern concept of ethnicity (or nation) based on
racial differences (Thierry 1989; Crossley 1990; Gledney 1991). The core issue
in these studies is the traditional notion of Chinese nationality represented
by the identity of Zhongguo ren ¤¤°ê¤H which implies civilized people living in the Central Kingdom. However, the sense of
the people in the Central Kingdom was not a self-sustained notion but one that
needed to be supplemented by alienating boundaries; through describing the
alien and uncivilized nature of those on the periphery, and commemorating
military acts toward them, the oneness of the people within these boundaries
was confirmed (Wang 1997a: 289-319). The Qiang was a Chinese ethnic boundary of
this kind. But, most significantly, it was the oldest, least stable, and most
nebulous boundary between the Han and non-Han people. This explains why,
although now a minor population, the history of the Qiang is crucial to the Han
and other nationalities as well as a force in strengthening the historical
unity of the nation ¾ Zhonghua minzu.
I
wish to thank the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly
Exchange for a contribution to my field expenses in 1995-1997. I also thank
National Science Council in Taiwan for the support of a project on archival
research on China¡¦s southwestern minorities in
1997-1998.
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[1] Before receiving the ethnic
label Qiangzu, an ethnic autonym rma
or its sound-alikes have represented the widest range concept of ¡§our people¡¨ among natives include no more
than people of a few mountain villages or inhabitants in a small valley. While
the natives become Qiang zu, rma and
its sound-alikes are generally used by native litrati, ignoring the variant
pronunciation of the word, in Mandarin as erma.
[2] For Tibetanized people in
this period I mean the people who became Lama Buddhists and whose leaders
declared their Tufan or bod (Tibetan)
origins.
[3] In some areas, there are sbie or ferh, instead of tshep,
refering the barbarians upstream.
[4] During the Warring States
period (450-221 B.C.), an ethnonym Di-Qiang
¥ÂªÊ appeared in Chinese
documents. It appeared mainly in the works of philosophers as a name for some
legendary western people known only by hearsay. During the Qin (221-206 B.C.)
and the Former Han (202 B.C.-A.D. 7) dynasties, as knowledge about the western
peoples increased greatly, Chinese split the concept of Di-Qiang into two human categories, the Di and the Qiang,
indicating two groups of culturally distinguished people in the Lungxi area.
For details on the conceptual changes concerning the ethnic labels, Di-Qiang, Di and the Qiang, in
ancient Chinese mind¡¦s eye, see Wang 1992: 116-20;
1997a: 236-43.
[5] As Wen Yu stated in his
article in 1941: ¡§We would not know that there
were still Qiang people in this territory if we did not come to western
Sichuan. A race that has long appeared in ancient documents has not been
extinguished through countless migrations and mixtures (with others) in
thousands of years, and no one in the world even knows this. It is most
regretful to our academic circle.¡¨
(Wen Yu 1941).
[6] The Jiang clan was an
important political and military force with which the Zhou allied to conquer the
Shang, and also the clan from which the Zhou kings frequently took their wives.
It has been widely assumed that the Jiang clan was a branch of, or identical
with, the Qiang; The phonetic and graphic similarities between the surname
Jiang «¸ and the
ethnic label Qiang ªÊ
led scholars to believe that these two words are identical etymologically
(Pulleyblank 1983). I have argued against this theory in my doctoral
dissertation (1992: 105-108) and other work (1997: 231-33).